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ABSTRACT.  In  this article, the  effectiveness of the  International  Whaling  Commission  (IWC)  is  discussed in relation to three criteria: stated goals, 
correspondence between  scientific  advice  and  political decisions, and relative improvement  in  relation to the status quo. Under these criteria, the 
IWC has a  low score on effectiveness in its initial  phase (1949 to mid-I960s), but  increased effectiveness in  the  next stage (mid-1960s to late 1970s). 
However, in  the  most  recent  history  of  the W C ,  effectiveness  has  again  been decreasing. Two main  perspectives  have  been  used  in trying to explain 
the  development  within  the IWC; first and  most important, the  assumption is that effectiveness will  vary  according  to  differences  in  the type of 
problems  and  related  state preferences; the more “malign” the problem, the lower the effectiveness. Also, it is assumed that, although  to  a lesser 
degree, effectiveness  will  be  influenced by the  problem-solving  capacity  related to the cooperation in question. This  approach is based on the design 
outlined for a large comparative  research  project  on  the  effectiveness  of  intemational‘ksource  and  environmental  management.  In  this article, owever, 
this perspective is used  in  a  very  simplified form, primarily  to  systematize  the  history  and performance of the W C .  
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RkSUMk. Dans  cet article, on discute de l’efficacit6 de la  Commission  baleinikre  internationale  (CBI)  selon tr is critkres:  les  buts  exprimBs,  l’accord 
entre les avis  scientifiques  et les dkisions politiques, et l’amklioration relative par rapport au statu  quo.  Selon ces crieres, la  CBI affiche une  faible 
efficacitk dans sa  phase  initiale  (1949 - milieu des annhs 60), mais  augmente  son  efficacitk. dans la  phase  suivante  (milieu des annkes 60 - fin 
des annks 70). Demikrement cependant, l’effkacitk. de la CBI  est de nouveau en baisse.  On utilise deux grands axes pour tenter d’expliquer cette 
Bvolution au  sein de la CBI.  On  suppose  d’abord  et surtout que  I’efficacitB variera en fonction des types de problhmes  et des prBfBrences de chaque 
ktat il leur sujet;  plus le problkme sera ukpineuxm, moins il y aura d’efficacitk.  On  suppose aussi, bien qu’il un degrB moindre, que  l’efficacit6 sera 
influench par la  capacitk. de rksolution de problkmes relih il la coophation en question. Cette approche est fondh sur le plan  d’un  grand projet 
de recherche comparative sur  l’efficacit6 de la  gestion des ressources et de l’environnement au  niveau international. Dans cet article, cette perspective 
n’est  cependant utilide que  sous  une forme trhs simplifih, surtout dans le but  de  systkmatiser l’histoire et la performance de la CBI. 
Mots cl&: efficacit6, Commission baleinikre internationale, science, politique, international, ressource, gestion, int6rêts, puissance, institutions 
Traduit pour le journal par NBsida Loyer. 
HOW AND  WHY  STUDY  EFFECTIVENESS? 
Over the years, political  scientists  have  been  preoccupied  with 
conditions  for  the  establishment of international  cooperation. 
Less attention  has  been  paid to whether  the different regimes 
created  have  actually been able to solve  the  problems  they  have 
been  established to deal  with.  Such an approach, however, is 
necessary if the  international  community is to be  able to learn 
from  past  “successes”  and  “failures.”  There are severe method- 
ological  ambiguities  and  problems  associated  with the concept 
of regime  ffectiveness (Underdal, 1992). Nevertheless, 
however  crude  and  impressionistic  the  findings  prove  to  be,  the 
effectiveness of international  resource  and  environmental 
management  is  the  perspective  chosen  by a joint  research  project 
conducted by the  University of Washington,  the  University of 
Oslo  and  the  Fridtjof  Nansen Institute (Miles et al., 1991). 
One main approach behind this research project is the 
comparative perspective, how do some  international  resource 
regimes  compare to others (Wettestad  and  Andresen, 1991)? 
This article assesses  one  cooperative venture, the International 
Whaling  Commission  (IWC). However, the analytical 
perspective is used in a very simplified form, basically to 
systematize  the  broad  lines in the history  and  performance of 
the W C .  The  aim is not  to give a detailed  empirical  account 
of the history of the IWC. Others have  covered  that  topic in 
great depth  (T$nnesen  and Johnsen, 1982; Birnie, 1985). The 
focus here is on the  changing nature of the  IWC  based on some 
critical turning  points  and  exploring what the implications of 
these  changes are for the IWC  and how  they  can  be  explained. 
The main sources used are relatively few and mainly of a 
secondary  nature.  However  the  more  recent  history of the  IWC 
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is based on more  independent  research - observations of the 
actual  negotiations,  as  well as interviews  with  key actors, for 
example, in the IWC Secretariat. 
The  methodological  problems of defining  effectiveness  will 
not  be  dealt  with here. Suffice  it  to  say  that three indicators of 
“effectiveness” are relied upon: 1) the degree to which the 
cooperating  parties  have  achieved the declared  goals of 
cooperation; 2) the degree of correspondence between.expert 
advice  (indicating  what would  be  the technically/scientifically 
ideal solution) and the regulatory/political decisions taken; 
3) the degree of improvement  in  relation  to  the  hypothetical 
state of affairs that  would  have occurred had no international 
cooperation been initiated  in  the  field  in  question  (Wettestad  and 
Andresen, 1991). 
Two main explanations are focused on. First, “effectiveness” 
will probably vary due to differences in the nature of the 
problems and related  state  preferences.  International  agreements 
designed to solve  harder or “malign” problems,  characterized, 
for example, by differing  preferences  and  strong interests, will 
normally  be  less  effective  than  agreements  to  solve easy, less 
complex  and  less  conflictual  problems. However, it is a fairly 
trivial assumption  that  difficult  problems  will  lead  to  reduced 
effectiveness and vice versa. Therefore, I also want to see 
whether  the  problem-solving  capacity  related  to  the  cooperation 
in  question makes any difference to the  degree of 
“effectiveness. ” Problem-solving  capacity can be conceived  of 
as a function of, for example,  the  institutional  setting  and  the 
skill and  energy  invested  in  the  politics  of  cooperative  solutions 
(Underdal, 1992). Will  such “softer” factors  ucceed  in 
influencing  the  effectiveness of the  organization in question, 
~~~ 
or is  effectiveness  exclusively  the  result of  the  interests  and  state 
preferences  following  from  the nature of the problem? 
First, a short  overview of the  background  and  history of the 
IWC  and  some  of  its main organizational  features are presented. 
Thereupon  an  assessment  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  IWC is 
given  and  finally  an  explanation of the  changing  performance 
of the  IWC is accounted for. The  history of the  IWC is split 
into three phases  due to differences  in its performance  as  well 
as  differences in the  nature of the  problem  facing the IWC. 
THE  INTERNATIONAL  CONVENTION 
FOR THE REGULATION OF WHALING (ICRW): 
BACKGROUND, PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION 
Although  whaling  has  been  conducted for hundreds of years, 
it was  not  until  the  technological progress of this century  that 
it became a large  industry.  Whaling  moved  into  Antarctic  waters 
and by the end of the 1930s the Antarctic  seas  were  producing 
some 85% of the  world  catch  (T6nnesen  and  Johnsen,  1982). 
Although  some  8-10  countries  undertook  pelagic  whaling  in  the 
1930s, the industry  was  completely  dominated by Norway  and 
the  United  Kingdom,  which  between  them  accounted for more 
than 95% of the  catches  (Tbnnesen  and  Johnsen,  1982). By the 
1930s  the  whaling  industry  constituted a significant  segment of 
these countries’ national  economies  and  it  accounted for one- 
sixth  of the  world  sea  catch by weight (Holt, 1985: 193). 
Although there were  attempts  both  internationally  and 
nationally to regulate  whaling prior to  World  War 11, generally 
“all sizes  and  all  species  were  fair  game”  (McHugh,  1974:322). 
Also,  it  was  not  concern  for  the  whale  populations  that  motivated 
regulations but rather the huge expansion of the whaling 
industry, causing  the  supply of whale  oil to exceed  what  the 
market  could absorb. As the  two countries that  demonstrated 
the  strongest  resistance  to  international  regulation of whaling 
during  the  1930s,  Japan  and  Germany,  were no longer  active 
players  in the whaling  business, “the period  following  World 
War I1 marked a tremendous opportunity for whale 
conservation” (Scarff, 1977:351). 
The  present  International  Convention  for  the  Regulation of 
Whaling  (ICRW)  was  set  up  at  an  international  conference  in 
Washington  in  1946,  based  mainly on a U.S. draft. The ICRW 
came  into  force  in  1948,  and by 1950  sixteen  nations,  including 
all  major  pelagic  whaling  nations, had  ratified the convention 
(Birnie, 1985). During the first stage of its  history (late 1940s- 
mid-l960s), the  IWC  was for all  practical  purposes a “whaling 
club,” completely dominated by the interests of the pelagic 
whaling  nations  operating  in  Antarctic  waters.  The larger whales 
especially  were  heavily  depleted  in this period. However, in 
the next phase,  from  the  mid-1960s to the  end of the  1970s, 
the number  of  Antarctic  whaling  nations  was  greatly  reduced 
and several  conservation  measures to protect  remaining  whales 
were  taken.  In  the third and most recent  history of the  IWC, 
there has  been a strong  influx  of new members to the 
organization  and  commercial  hunting  of  whales ha been banned 
(Wettestad and Andresen, 1991). 
The purpose of the ICRW is to provide for the proper 
conservation of whale stocks and thus enable the orderly 
development of the  whaling  industry. The Schedule  (Articles 
I and V) forms an integral part of the convention  and is an 
instrument to secure  flexibility  in  that  it  allows  for  the  amending 
of the  more  detailed  regulations  written  down in the Schedule. 
In  Article V(l) the  provision of the Schedule is spelled out, 
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including  fixing  protected  and  unprotected species, open  and 
closed  seasons  and waters, size limits  and  maximum  catch of 
whales for one season. A three-fourths majority  is  required  to 
amend the Schedule. The proposed  amendments  become 
effective  unless  the  contracting  governments  present  objections, 
thus  giving  the  members a de facto right of  veto on issues they 
value  as crucial to their  national interests. 
Article 111 provides  for the establishment of an  International 
Whaling  Commission (IWC), operative in 1949, “to be 
composed  of  one  member  from  each  Contracting  Government. ” 
Each  member  casts  one  vote  and may be  accompanied by one 
or more experts and advisers. The main function of the  IWC 
is  to  implement the ICRW. A Scientific  Committee  (Scicom), 
where  the  member  nations may have  any  number  of  represen- 
tatives  they choose, reviews  catch  data  and  research  programs 
and  makes  scientific  recommendations  based on their  review. 
All  states  may  become  members  of the IWC, irrespective of 
their  whaling interests. A secretariat for the  IWC is in 
Cambridge, England. 
ASSESSING  THE  EFFECTIVENESS  OF  THE IWC 
Phase I (1946 to mid-1960s): 
No Conservation and No Orderly  Development 
With the  benefit of hindsight, many analysts  have  pointed  out 
the  incompatibility  between  the  goals  of  conservation  of  whales 
and  consideration for the  interests of  the  whaling industry.  Still, 
these  two goals, although  both  vague  and  maybe  inconsistent, 
differ little from what is often  reflected in national  laws for 
fisheries management today, attempting to balance different 
interests  (”Gonigle,  1980; Andmen, 1989a).  As  the  convention 
is written, conservation is primarily  looked  upon  as a means 
to secure  the  orderly  development of the whaling industry.  This 
is not surprising, as at the  time of the drafting of the  ICRW 
conservation  as  such had little meaning for the  majority of the 
“founding fathers. ” 
If goal  achievement is to be judged by the end of this period, 
it is bound to be low, since by the mid-1960s whaling in 
Antarctic waters, the area within  the  realm  of  IWC  regulations 
in this period, was  about to become  history.  Catches  were  down 
to a fraction of  what  they  had been;  4500  blue  whale  units  (one 
bwu equals one  blue  whale,  two fins, two  and a half  humpbacks 
or six  sei  whales  and is related to the oil produced  from  each 
species) in 1965  compared to approximately 16 OOO bwu the 
two  preceding  decades  and a mere  10-15 % of  catches just prior 
to  World  War 11 (Tghesen and  Johnsen,  1982).  Moreover, the 
whaling  nations  were no longer  able to fulfil the  strongly  reduced 
quotas  (McHugh,  1974). Thus, the IWC was unsuccessful  in 
managing  the  whale  stocks  both  as  regards “conservation” and 
“orderly development. ” 
Scientific  uncertainty was  very  high  at the conception of the 
ICRW.  The  quota  was  set at 16 OOO bwu, but this figure was 
little more than a “guesstimate” arrived at by three scientists 
(T6nnesen  and  Johnsen,  1982:  157).  According to one of them: 
“the two others were  pleased  that I suggested this figure  instead 
of 15 OOO or 20 OOO bwu.  It  looked  more reliable.” Although 
uncertainty as to the size of the  whale  stocks was  somewhat 
reduced  throughout  the  1950s,  it  was till considerable.  Initially 
there was a “perfect match” between scientific advice and 
regulations adopted, as the IWC decided to set the quota at 
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16 000 bwu.  Later on, however, when  more regular  procedures 
for scientific  advice  were adopted, it  became  evident  that  the 
majority of scientists  on  the  Scientific  Committee  declared  that 
the quotas  were  too high, but  they  found  it  difficult  to  quantify 
necessary reductions (Rldssum, 1984; Andresen, 1989). This 
general concern, however,  did  not  result in reduced  quotas. 
Beginning in the early 1960s, concrete reductions were also 
suggested, but  initially  the  IWC  failed  to  follow the advice of 
the  scientists  (Andresen,  1989a:  104).  Later  even a quota  of  3000 
bwu might have been too high (McHugh, 1974:309). 
What  about  relative  improvement  in  relation  to  the  status  quo? 
Obviously, nobody  knows  what  would  have  happened  to  the 
Antarctic  whales in the  absence of international  regulations. 
Still, some  speculations seem warranted. On the  one  hand, the 
quota set by the  IWC  and  the  actual  catch  was  quite  modest 
compared  to  catches  in  the  period  immediately prior to  World 
War 11,  when some 30 OOO bwu were  taken - indicating  that 
depletion would  have  been  even stronger with  no international 
regulation. On the other  hand,  it  was a common  assumption 
that  the  resources  were  already  seriously  depleted  as a result 
of  intensive  catches in the  prewar  period  (Tqhnesen  and  Johnsen, 
1982). It is therefore an open question whether the whalers 
would  have  been  able to catch  more  than the stipulated  quota 
had  they  been  allowed  to.  In addition, the  adoption of the bwu 
as a regulative tool, based  on  the  whaling  companies’  prewar 
oil production agreements, as  well as the fact  that there were 
no  national  quotas  and o limitation of number of factory  ships 
and  land stations, intensified  competition  and  laid  the  ground 
for the  “whaling Olympics” in the 1950s  and  the first part of 
the 1960s (Scarff, 1977).  Thus  it may be  that at least by the 
beginning of the  1960s the situation would  have  been  no  worse 
with  no  regulation  at all. Improvement in relation  to  the  status 
quo was thus  marginal or non-existent. 
Phase II (mid-1960s to late 1970s): 
Increased  Efiectiveness 
Goal  achievement is fairly  easy to assess  in the fust phase 
of  the  history  of  the  IWC,  as  failure  is so obvious.  When  moving 
into  the latter half  of  the  1960s,  goal  achievement is clearly on 
the increase. A number of concrete  measures  were  taken to 
protect  the  remaining  Antarctic  whales a well  as  whales in other 
parts of the oceans in this period. 
As important Antarctic stocks were depleted, the whaling 
industry  gradually  shifted  focus  from  the  Antarctic  to  the  North 
Pacific  and  the  North  Atlantic.  While  approximately 75% of 
all  whales  taken  in  the  1950s  came  from  Antarctic waters, this 
was  down to 62% in 1966/67 (Hoel, 1985:54).  However,  the 
IWC responded  to this development by including new species 
and areas that  had  previously  been  unregulated,  and by 1976 
all  whale  stocks had their own  quotas.  In  this period, the  bwu 
as a management  unit  was  finally  abolished  and  separate  quotas 
were  set for different  species (Andresen, 1989a:106).  Another 
important  decision  taken in the mid-1970s  was the adoption  of 
a new  management procedure  (NMP).  The  stocks  were  divided 
into three categories depending upon their “health” and the 
different  stocks  were to be  managed  in  such a manner that they 
could  be  classified  as  sustained  management  stocks (SMS). The 
adoption of these and other measures pointed towards an 
increased  emphasis  on  the  conservation of “new” and “old” 
whale stocks (Hoel,  1985). As  such this also provided  for a more 
orderly development of the  remaining  whaling industry. 
National  quotas  reduced  competition,  and  from  the  end of the 
1960s there remained  only  two  Antarctic  whaling  nations  (the 
U.S.S.R.  and  Japan).  The  problem of “pirate whaling” was 
also reduced, as  many  of  the  nations  conducting  smaller  scale 
whaling  outside their respective  coasts  and  those  that had  not 
previously been members of the IWC were now gradually 
brought into the IWC (Hoel, 1985). Thus, goal achievement 
was  obviously  increasing  in this period. 
From  the  mid-l96Os, there was also a stronger inclination 
to follow  scientific advice, and in 1967, “21 years after it had 
been established,  the IWC had  agreed  on a quota  that  was  below 
scientific  estimates  of the  sustainable  yield  of the  stock”  (Scarff, 
1977:366).  It  is  said  that  the  adoption of the  NMP  “marked 
the  strongest  and  most  specific  commitment  to  conservation  that 
the IWC had ever undertaken” (Scarff, 1977:366). Later on 
it  was  amply  demonstrated  that the introduction of the concept 
of sustainability,  upon  which  the  NMP is based,  concerning  fish 
as well  as  whales  is  no “magic  words” in  the  sense  that  manage- 
ment of the living  resources of the  ocean  automatically  became 
more  effective. As  with the  slogan  “sustainable  development,” 
“sustainable yield” is also  difficult  to  bring into operation and 
the  data  fed  into the models are often inferior (Hoel, 1985). 
The point here, however, is that the very  adoption of the  NMP 
was a manifestation of a strong  inclination  on  the  part of the 
IWC to give science a much more prominent place in the 
decision-making  system.  However,  there  was  still  disagreement 
in  the  Scicom,  the  advice  given was  not  always  unambiguous 
and the match  between  advice  and  decisions  was far from  perfect 
(Birnie, 1985). 
There was considerable  improvement in the  achievements of 
the  IWC  in  this  period  compared to the  status  quo. It is hardly 
conceivable  that  the  Antarctic  whaling  nations or the  smaller 
coastal-based  whaling  nations would  have  been  able to 
accomplish by themselves what  was  accomplished  by the IWC 
in this period in terms of  both conservation and orderly 
development.  Experience  from  the  early  and  unregulated  days 
of whaling  as  well  as from open-access  regimes for fisheries 
supports such an assumption (Underdal, 1980). 
Phase III (late-1970s to the Present): 
A “New” IWC Emerges 
In 1982, at  the  34th  meeting of the IWC, a proposal for the 
cessation  of  commercial  whaling  (zero  quotas,  not a moratorium 
as  such)  from  1986 was approved  and  became  operative  two 
years later (Andresen, 1989a: 110). The  so-called  moratorium 
on commercial  whaling was temporary, pending a comprehen- 
sive  stock  assessment by 1990. The IWC  has still not  opened 
up for commercial whaling, but one of its member states, 
Norway,  has  declared its intention  to start commercial  whaling 
in the 1993  season (Cherfas, 1992a). Thus, over  the last years, 
the  function of  the  IWC  has  not  been the  management of whales 
through  stipulating  quotas,  as  before.  Issues now  being  discussed 
are aboriginal  rights  to  land  whales,  small  cetaceans,  humane 
.killing and, not least, whaling for so-called  scientific  purposes 
(Birnie, 1985). 
Due to the adoption and effective implementation of the 
moratorium, the whaling industry has virtually disappeared, 
although there are a few remnants left mainly due to the 
controversial whaling for scientific  purposes.  Provided there 
are whales to catch  commercially,  as  appears to be the case, 
the  effectiveness  again  appears  to  be  reduced in relation  to  goal 
achievement,  recalling  the  dual  purpose  of  the  ICRW.  Logically, 
it may be  that  “extreme  conservation” has been needed for some 
time  to  enable  the  whale  stocks to recover  in order to  lay  the 
foundation for an “orderly development” of a future whale 
industry. As will  be  shown later, this is not a very  probable 
interpretation, considering the present “climate” of the IWC. 
Rather, it  appears  that not  only  conservation,  but  also 
preservation is now  seen as a goal in  itself  by the majority of 
the  IWC  members.  In a sense a de  facto  redefinition of the  goal 
of the ICRW has been made by the majority of the IWC 
members,  although de  jure the  convention is the  same.  Should 
such a redefinition in the direction of preservation  be  accepted 
as  the “real” aim, the  present  goal  achievement  would  be  very 
high. However, as  long  as  the  suggestions  of a revision of the 
ICRW  have  been rejected, although  the  question  has  been on 
the  IWC  agenda for more  than a decade, such a redefinition 
of the goal  cannot  be  accepted. 
A key question in assessing  the  effectiveness in this period 
concerns  the  scientific  basis for the  moratorium.  Unfortunately 
this question is very  difficult to answer, due to extreme 
polarization  and  blurring  of  the  lines  between  science  and  policy 
in  the  IWC  in  the  1980s  (Andresen,  1989a).  Generally,  scientists 
representing non-whaling nations  have  supported  the 
moratorium, claiming that scientific uncertainty and lack of 
knowledge of the  size of the different stocks  should  come  to 
the benefit of the  whale, a kind  of “precautionary approach. ” 
This  view  has  also been supported  by  scientists  working  in  close 
cooperation  with  certain  environmental NGOs  strongly  opposed 
to whaling.  Scientists  from  the  (previous)  major  whaling  nations, 
on the other hand,  have  claimed  that there was no scientific 
justification for a “blanket moratorium” on whaling (Birnie, 
1985; Hoel, 1985; Andresen, 1989a). 
Due to the  strong  infusion of politics  and  emotions  in  the 
Scicom over  the  last  decade,  it is debatable  whether it is  possible 
to assess the correspondence between scientific advice and 
political  decisions  in this period.  Moreover, a political  scientist 
is not in a position  to judge the scientific  content of this  intense 
controversy. The  fact  that  the  author is from  Norway,  which 
strongly  opposes the so-called  moratorium,  increases  the 
obvious  danger of bias on this point.  In my opinion,  however, 
science was not a driving force behind the adoption of the 
moratorium; it was mainly politically motivated. Emphasis 
should  be  placed  on a statement by the  United  Nations  Food 
and  Agricultural  Organization  (FAO) -presumably  not a part 
of the  controversy - at  the  IWC  special  meeting  in  1982: “the 
conservation of commercial  whaling  can also be  threatened by 
management  measures  that are too  restrictive.  The  most  extreme 
example is a moratorium on all  commercial  whaling . . . there 
seems  to  be no scientific justification for a global  moratorium 
. . . A justification . . . can be  put  forward on aesthetic or moral 
grounds, but these seem outside  the  terms of reference of the 
Commission.  The  best if not the only way to determine the 
sustainable yield of the whale stocks is carefully monitored 
harvesting”  (Birnie,  1983:M). It  should  also be mentioned  that 
Switzerland,  which  cannot  be  accused  of  considering  its  whaling 
interests when  voting,  did  not think the proposal of zero quotas 
was  fully  justified  by  scientific  findings  and  voted  against  it 
(Birnie, 1985). Also, a selective moratorium on threatened 
whale  stocks had already  been  introduced by the strict 
implementation of the NMP (Birnie, 1985).  This  being said, 
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others have  reached the opposite  conclusion on this point:  that 
the  so-called  moratorium  was  indeed  scientifically  justified.  For 
example, a key person in the  controversy  over  management of 
whales, Dr. Sidney Holt, maintained  that a moratorium would 
enable  the  IWC at least  to  get  down  to “real  science”; social 
relations  of  whales  could  only  be  studied if there was no whaling 
(Birnie, 1985). 
More recently, there is no longer any  scientific  doubt  that 
certain whale  species are abundant  enough to be  commercially 
taken, but the  majority of the  IWC  members  still  maintain  that 
no commercial  catch  should  be  allowed (Cherfas, 1992b).  This 
considerably  strengthens the assumption  that  he  distance 
between  scientific  advice  and  policies  adopted is considerable 
and  points  towards  reduced  effectiveness  in  our  perspective. 
The  difference  between  the  hypothetical “no regulation”  and 
the  policy  adopted by the  IWC  in  this  period is considerable. 
There is no doubt  that  whaling  would  have  been  conducted on 
a considerably  larger  scale had it not been for  the  IWC  decisions. 
Before the adoption of zero quotas, increasingly strict 
regulations had reduced the catch of whales  successively, but 
only  very  reluctantly  did Japan, as the  last  whaling  nation,  quit 
commercial  operations by 1988  (Andresen,  1989a: 111). 
Considering  the  negative  experience from pre-IWC  history  as 
well  as  the  early  history of the IWC,  it may be that  the race 
for  the (last)  whales  would  have  continued  throughout the  1980s 
had it not  been for the  IWC  moratorium - although  economic 
considerations  would  probably  have  prevented  that (Hoel,  1987). 
The  cautious  management  policy of the IWC in this period  and 
then  the  moratorium  have hdoubtedly contributed to an  increase 
in the population of most whale species (Gulland, 1988). 
Considering the depleted  state of  many  major stocks, this is 
undoubtedly a step in the right direction. 
However, a continued  moderate  catch of certain species  in 
line with  the IWC policy  of the 1970s  and early 1980s would 
probably  have  been justified from an  ecological  point of view 
and would also have  considered  the interests of the  remaining 
whaling industry, mostly  based  in  small  coastal  communities 
in  countries like Norway  and  Japan (Hoel, 1987).  Whether a 
moderate  catch would have  been  possible  without the IWC, 
however, is maybe  not  very  likely  based on previous  experience 
from the  history of whaling. 
Overall Effectiveness 
It is not  possible  to  give  an “average score’’ on the effective- 
ness  of the  IWC  in  its  more  than 40 years of existence, as there 
has been considerable  variation  over  time.  Effectiveness was 
low  in  the first period, but increased  over the next  decade or 
so. The last phase is more difficult to evaluate due to the 
politicized nature of the issue. The latest developments  within 
the IWC indicate that effectiveness has again been reduced. 
However,  the nature of the “low” scores in  the first and the 
last period are quite different. In a sense the score should 
probably  be  lower  in the first years of the history of the IWC, 
as  important  whale  stocks  were  about t  become  extinct.  Now, 
after all, whale  stocks are gradually  recovering. A key question 
for assessing  the effect of the  moratorium  as  well  as the future 
developments of the  IWC is whether  the  present zero quotas 
are seen as a means  for  whale stocks to recover  and  ,subsequently 
be  hunted  commercially or whether they are seen as a step to 
stop all whaling irrespective of the  status  of  the stocks. 
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EXPLAINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE IWC 
Phase 1: Dificult Problem and 
Low Problem-Solving  Capacity 
What  was  the  nature of the  problem  facing  the  IWC  nations 
at its inauguration?  The  major  challenge for the  IWC  was to 
reduce  the  competitive  element  in a way  that  secured  an “orderly 
development” of the  industry  as  well  as  avoiding  pressure  upon 
the total  quota.  The  Antarctic  whaling  nations,  the  dominating 
players  deciding the direction and the pace of the  IWC  in  this 
period, were  neither  able nor  willing  to  address  these  problems 
due to  the perceptions of their  short-term  economic interests 
(T$nnesen  and Johnsen,  1982). As for  the  other  IWC  members, 
although they  had  no material interests in the  Antarctic issue, 
they were  generally also engaged  in  some  kind  of  whaling  and 
were anxious that their interests should not suffer due to a 
stronger IWC (Birnie, 1985).  Although  the  contracting  parties 
had agreed to set  up the IWC,  few or none  of  them  initially 
had  any intention of  giving this body a strong  position. Thus, 
the  regime they  had created  allowed for the  continued over- 
exploitation of the  large Antarctic  whales. 
The  most  important  issues  in  this  period - the question of 
national  quotas and the  limitations of factory  ships  and  land 
stations - were  dealt  with  outside  the  realm of the  IWC.  The 
whaling  nations  had  defined this as their  problem  and  the  ICRW 
explicitly  prohibited the IWC from  involvement  in  this  issue 
(Article V[2][c]).  The  IWC  could  only  set a total quota, and 
already in 1947/48 the  catch  capacity of the whaling  industry 
was sufficient to take the total  quota of  16 OOO bwu  (TBnnesen 
and Johnsen, 1982). This problem  was  aggravated by the fact 
that  there  were  significant  differences  among  the  whaling  nations 
as to the size  and structure of their whaling industries. Japan 
and  the  Soviet  Union  were “upcoming” whaling  nations,  with 
new equipment,  and they were  steadily  expanding.  Some  were 
small, like South  Africa  and  the  Netherlands, but eager  to  stay 
in operation, while others, such  as  Great  Britain  and  Norway, 
were still big, but with old ships and equipment. Thus, the 
whaling  nations  had  different  interests  and  would  be  differently 
affected by the regulations  adopted.  Obviously,  Japan  and the 
U.S.S .R. as  the stronger parties saw  their interests best  served 
by a total quota.  The  other  Antarctic  nations  gradually  came 
to favour  national quotas, but  if  this  could  not  be  achieved  they 
wanted the total  quotas  as large as possible.  The  main  reason 
an  agreement  between  the  whaling  nations was  finally  reached 
after many  years of difficult  negotiations  in  the  early  1960s  was 
that  most  Antarctic  whaling  nations  no  longer  found it profitable 
to continue their operations. Thus, Japan and the U.S.S.R. 
bought the quotas from the others and  were left alone on the 
scene (T$nnesen and Johnsen, 1982). 
The name of  the  problem  and  related  perceived  state  interests 
constitute  the main  explanation  for  the  poor  performance of the 
IWC in this period. Did the IWC as an institution and its 
problem-solving  capacity  make  any difference at all? The de 
facto  veto  right of the  IWC  members  made  the  “law of the  least 
ambitious programme” (Underdal, 1980)  work  unfailingly in 
the greater part of this period; that is, no decision  went  beyond 
the interests of the least enthusiastic (Antarctic whaling) 
member. The Netherlands  and  Norway  also  left the IWC for 
a short  time  around  1960  due to differences  with other whaling 
nations  (Birnie,  1985). As the independent  institutional  basis 
in the larger part of this  initial  phase  in  the  history of the  IWC 
was so weak,  the  IWC as such  had  no  means  of  checking the 
power  and  interests  of  the  whaling  nations.  The  important  game 
was  played  outside  the  IWC  over  the  questions of quotas.  Also, 
meetings  of the  Scientific  Committee  were  infrequently  held  and 
a number of countries  did  not  participate (Allen, 1980). 
In the  early  1960s  the first signs of a somewhat  stronger role 
for the  IWC  can  be  observed  in the setting of quotas. First only 
the  whaling  industry  was  involved  in the negotiations,  then  the 
states  were  brought  in  and  finally the IWC,  indicating  that  it 
was about  to become  something  more  than a passive 
prolongation of the interests of the  whaling  nations  (T$nnesen 
and Johnsen,  1982). Gradually, the  commission  also  realized 
that  the  IWC  was in acute need  of  improved  scientific advice. 
In 196 1 a committee of three independent scientists, later 
extended to four, drawn  from  countries  not  engaged in  pelagic 
whaling  in  Antarctic  waters  was  set  up.  The  group  was  appointed 
by the chairman of the  commission  and  vice-chairman of the 
Scientific  Committee  (Andresen,  1989a:  104). This small  group 
of scientists  was  able  to do what the Scicom  had  failed  to  do: 
provide  specific  and  detailed  advice. This group  worked  from 
1961 to 1964, and  then  another “outside” organ was brought 
in; the FA0 carried out stock assessments on behalf of the 
commission  until  1969  (Andresen,  1989a: 104). This  improve- 
ment  in procedures  and  substance  as  regards  knowledge 
production no  doubt  strengthened  the  authority  and  legitimacy 
of the  IWC.  The  more  precise  advice was probably also one 
reason for the  reduction of quotas  gradually  taking  place  in  the 
1960s,  although of  at  least equal  importance was  surely the  fact 
that  the  whaling  nations  were  no  longer  able  to fulfil their  quotas 
(McHugh,  1974).  The  scientists  gradually  also  exerted  stronger 
and more independent pressure upon the Antarctic whaling 
nations. Due to frustration over the unwillingness of these 
countries to accept  the  advice  for  reduced  quotas,  the  chairman 
of  the  Scicom  threatened to resign.  Similarly,  the FA0 represen- 
tative  of  the  “Committee of Three” made it clear that the FA0 
would not continue to cooperate with the IWC if scientific 
findings  were  merely  used for a more efficient depletion of 
whale stocks (R$ssum, 1984). 
The  fact  that  the  power  base  of  the  whaling  nations  diminished 
(fewer  nations  and  reduced  economic  importance) also gradually 
created  more  room for political “entrepreneurs,”  or leaders 
(Young,  1991)  within  the  IWC.  The US .  commissioner,  Brian 
Kellog, the main entrepreneur behind the ICRW, had long 
worked  unfailingly  for a reduction of the  total  quota  as  well 
as  the  introduction of  national quotas. In the long run his work, 
status  and  active role, in  combination  with  these other factors, 
probably had a bearing  on the gradual  change in the role of the 
IWC. Thus, the reduced economic importance of whaling 
combined  with a more  active  and  independent role of the  IWC 
in the  1960s  created the basis for a more  effective  IWC in the 
next  period. 
Phase II: Easier  Problem and 
Increased  Problem-Solving Capaciv 
This middle  phase  in  the  history of the  IWC  is a transitionary 
one.  It  represents a continuation of the  positive  trend  started 
in the 1960s, but the first signs of the IWC  being  turned into 
a purely preservationist organization also begin to emerge. 
Catches of whales  in  Antarctic  waters  continued to decrease in 
the  1970s, the competitive  element was strongly  reduced  and 
the economic stakes were no longer so high for the nations 
involved. By 1980, whaling  constituted  less  than 0.2% of the 
global marine harvest by economic value (Allen, 1980:17). 
However, as whaling in other ocean areas was also  brought 
under  IWC  regulations,  the  number of  whaling  nations  affected 
by  IWC  regulations  increased (Hoel,  1985).  The  most  important 
development  regarding  whaling  in the 1970s,  however,  did  not 
take  place  within  the  IWC,  as  the  whale  was  about to be  adopted 
as maybe the most important symbol for the environmental 
movement  (Andresen,  1989b).  During the UN Conference on 
the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972, a 10-year 
moratorium on all  commercial  whaling  was  called for. Thus, 
by the  early  1970s  whaling was no longer  the  concern of the 
limited (ea. 15)  group of IWC  members  only.  The  gradually 
changing  perception of the  whale  strengthened  the  position of 
the  non-whaling  nations  and  with  the  reduced  economic  interests 
involved  made a more  conservation-oriented  policy in the  IWC 
possible (Wettestad and Andresen, 1991). 
Generally  the  institutional  problem-solving  capacity of the 
IWC  increased  strongly  in  this period. In short, the IWC  as  an 
organization seemed  to  have  “grown up”; communication  both 
within the  Scicom  and  between  the  Scicom  and  the  commission 
improved (Andresen, 1989a; Hoel, 1985). As a result of 
decreased  political  tension  and  polarization,  the  work  of  the  IWC 
ran  more  smoothly.  In  sum,  it appeared  that due to a 
combination of  an “easier” problem  and  increased  problem- 
solving  capacity, the issue of whaling  was  about to be “solved” 
in the  sense  that  whaling was  now carried out on a compara- 
tively  modest  level  along  the  lines of more  legitimate  scientific 
advice.  However,  the  strong  emotional  element of conservation 
that  had  started  to  grow  concerning  whaling  was soon to  enter 
the  IWC  with  full force, in essence  creating a completely new 
setting for the  management of whales. 
Phase 111: New Perceptions, Power  Coalitions 
ana’ Decreased Effectiveness 
In the most recent  history of the IWC, the dynamics in the 
battle  over  whaling  have  changed  completely.  This is due  both 
to the  changed  nature of the  problem as well  as  the  institutional 
setup of the  IWC. 
Again the  IWC  has  been  faced  with a most  difficult  problem. 
However, this  time  it  has  not  been  the  challenge of limiting  the 
race to catch whales, but tackling a complex political and 
environmental  problem  in an atmosphere  where  “saving  the 
whale is for millions of  people a crucial test of their  political 
ability to halt  environmental  destruction”  (Holt,  1985:  12).  The 
large  coalition of NGOs and  non-whaling  nations,  with  backing 
from the public, especially in the U.S. and the U.K., has 
succeeded  in  changing  the  agenda  and the very  thinking  about 
whales  and  whaling. It has been turned into a moral  question, 
where  saving  the  whales  has  become  associated  with  the  morally 
“good” approach,  whereas  catching  them is morally inferior, 
or “bad. ” It is no longer a question of managing a living 
resource, but a question of “saving” or “killing” whales. A 
strong  anti-whaling  position  has  become a rather  convenient  way 
of acquiring a “green” image, as no (material) costs were 
involved for the non-whaling  nations. This was especially  the 
case for large industrialized countries, such  as  the US., Great 
Britain,  Germany  and France, who  were often unable to claim 
a green image concerning other international environmental 
issues (Andresen, 1989b). 
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In this period,  the  issue-specific  power  of  the  whaling  nations, 
the fact  that  they  were  catching  whales,  has  lost  most of its 
relevance. Countries like Iceland, Norway and Japan have 
argued that management is both justifiable and reasonable 
provided  it  takes  place  within  the  limit of sustainable  yield of 
the relevant species, but  they  have  not  managed  to “sell” this 
idea.  Nor  has  it  helped  that  these  countries are the  major  ones 
with  regard  to  knowledge  and  research  on  the  issue of  whaling. 
Research efforts are generally  very  modest  both by the 
non-whaling  nations  and  the  IWC  secretariat  (Andresen,  1989a). 
Thus, the former whaling  nations  have  lost the battle for the 
media and the public,  although a more  offensive  counter-strategy 
has  been  adopted  over  the  last  couple  of years; for example, 
lobbying  activity is no longer  confined to environmental NGOs 
only. Although in a small minority, groups supportive of 
commercial whaling are following suit. The fact  hat  he 
Scientific  Committee  has now been able to agree on a revised 
management  procedure (RMP) , not  least  as a result  of  the large 
research  programs  launched by the  former  whaling  nations,  has 
put  the  whaling  nations  more on the offensive.  It is no longer 
so easy to argue  that all commercial  whaling  should be banned. 
Still, this  has  apparently  failed  to  convince  the  NGOs or the 
majority of the  IWC  members  that  whaling on a limited  scale 
could justifiably be  resumed (Cherfas, 1992b). 
But  why did  the  whaling countries, some of them  albeit  very 
reluctantly  and  after  some  time,  abide by the  moratorium  in  the 
fust place?  As a traditional  international  organization the IWC 
had no means  of  halting  commercial  whaling  as  long  as  the 
whaling  nations  wished  to  continue.  They  could  simply  make 
use  of the objection  procedure  and  continue  as they  wished or 
they could  leave the IWC. Both options had previously  been 
used on several  occasions. 
Although the role of massive  public  opposition as well  as  the 
force of the moral argument  should  not be underestimated, the 
role of the  U.S.  in  this  context  has  probably been decisive for 
the  halt  in  commercial  whaling  (Aron,  1988). For one  thing, 
the U.S. has put legal instruments to use to stop whaling; 
sanctions  will be used against  nations  found  to  be  “diminishing 
the  effectiveness” of  an international  conservation  agreement 
to  which the U.S. is a party  (Andresen,  1989a:  11 ). Fisheries 
allocation in the U. S . economic  zone may be reduced by 50 % 
and there is also an  option for a partial or complete  embargo 
on fish products from relevant countries. The U.S. has  made 
use of these  instruments  as  well  as  traditional  power politics, 
and at least  until  recently  they  seem to have  served  their  purpose 
(Andresen, 1989a:  11 1). An agreement  between  the U.S. and 
Japan  in  1984 is illustrative.  The U.S. agreed not to apply  these 
provisions to Japan during a three-year period. In turn, Japan 
undertook to withdraw its objection to the  1981  IWC  ban on 
sperm whaling  and  its  objection to the  1982  moratorium. In the 
meantime, the U.S. “allowed” Japan a catch of 400 sperm 
whales  in the two  following  seasons (Birnie, 1986).  Obviously 
this was  political “horse-trading” of the traditional kind;  neither 
the IWC  nor  scientific  recommendations  were  left  much room. 
As the  U.S.  has now phased  out all foreign  vessels  from  its 
fishery  zone,  this  provision no longer has any effect. It is still 
unknown  what  political and/or legal measures, if any, will be 
taken by the U.S.  against  Norway. The fact  that  Norway  has 
declared  its  intention to resume  commercial  whaling  indicates 
that  the  threats of a trade  embargo on fish  products are no longer 
viewed as being as credible as they  used to be. Iceland has left 
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the  IWC  and  will  probably  also  resume  commercial  whaling 
(Cherfas, 1992b). The  important  point  o be made here, 
however, is that the U.S. position on the issue of whaling 
has  been, and probably  still is, more  important  than  the  IWC 
position. 
The core of  the  conflict  in the IWC  over the last  years  has 
dealt  with  principles  and  values  concerning  marine  mammals, 
which are possibly  even  more  difficult  to  agree on than  conflicts 
over more tangible material interests that characterized the 
earlier days of the IWC. This game, however, cannot be 
properly  understood  without  considering  the  dominant role of 
the U.S. in the implementation  of  the  moratorium.  Thus,  again 
the  general  problem  structure  accounts  for  the  broad  lines  in 
explaining  the  turn  of  events  in the IWC. 
However,  the  creation  of  an  essentially “new” IWC  cannot 
be properly understood without considering its institutional 
aspects. As mentioned earlier, the IWC is an “inclusive” 
organization,  in  the  sense  that  all  countries may become 
members  irrespective  of  their  interest  in  the  whaling  issue.  This 
aspect  proved  to  be  a  crucial  one  in  the  history of he IWC  from 
the  end  of the 1970s to the beginning  of  the 1980s. 
From the  establishment  of  the  IWC  and for approximately 
the  next 30 years,  the  number  of  contracting  governments  was 
fairly  stable,  approximately 15 (Hoel, 1985). Although  the non- 
whaling  members  generally  were the majority,  they  did  not  have 
the  three-fourths  majority  needed  to  amend  the  Schedule  against 
the  will  of  the  whaling  nations.  When  membership  started  to 
grow by the  end  of  the 1970s, the  first  group  of  nations  to  enter 
were the new whaling nations, mainly as a result of U.S. 
pressure  in  order  to  reduce  the  problem  of  “pirate  whaling” 
outside  the  IWC . Although  this  contributed to dealing  with  this 
problem, it also reduced the majority of the non-whaling 
members  (Hoel, 1985:69). However,  the  next  and  really  large 
influx  of  new  members  consisted  mostly  of  countries  with  no 
whaling  traditions  coming  from  the  Third  World. By 1979 the 
number  of  contracting  governments  had  increased to 23, in 1981 
it was 32, and  in 1983 it  was 41. If this  trend  was  to  continue, 
it  seemed  that the IWC  was  about to turn  into  a  truly  global 
organization  (Hoel, 1985:80). However,  thereafter  the  number 
of  participants  has  again  been  reduced. 
There  is little doubt  that the non-whaling  countries’  sudden 
concern  for  the  whaling  issue  came s a result of active  lobbying 
by environmental  organizations  (Gulland, 1988:45) who  needed 
to mobilize new nations in order to secure a three-fourths 
majority  behind  the  moratorium. The procedures  of  the  IWC 
made  this  possible,  and  consequently  the  IWC  was  transformed 
from  a  “whaling  club”  of  the 1950s to a  “preservationist  club” 
of  the 1980s - as the  overwhelming  majority  of  members  had 
no  (commercial)  stakes  in  whaling. If the  IWC  had  employed 
more  restrictive  membership criteria, characterizing,  for 
example, the Antarctic  Treaty  System, this would  not  have  been 
possible (Wettestad and Andresen, 1991). 
The  increased  number of observing  international  organizations 
has been no less dramatic. In 1965, five organizations sent 
observers,  with  obvious  interests as to how marine m a m m a l s  
were managed (R@ssum, 1984:161). Throughout the 1980s, 
some 50 NGOs have usually been present as observers. By 
traditional  standards,  these NGOs’ links  to  whales and  whaling 
were  not as clear  as  they had been  for  the  organizations  present 
in  the 1960s, but  then  again the perception  of  the  whaling  issue 
was not as it had been  formerly  (Birnie, 1982:75). 
The upshot of the increase in membership and observing 
NGOs  was  that the IWC  was no longer  one  of  those  more or 
less  anonymous  international  organizations  dealing  with  difficult 
technical  issues  mostly  of  concern  to the participants  only.  Now 
the strong emotional atmosphere surrounding the issue was 
brought into the negotiations, tending to further isolate the 
whaling  nations.  It  is  more  doubtful  whether  the  sharp  increase 
in  membership  as  well as in  attention  increased  the  problem- 
solving  capacity  of  the  IWC . Rather,  it  created  special  problems 
of  its  own;  many  of  the  newcomers  were  not  seriously  interested 
in  the  activity  of  the  IWC. By the  end  of  the 1980s,  13 of  the 
new  IWC members  had  failed to pay the required  fees.  Some 
had  never  paid  since  they  entered  in  the  early 1980s. Often  they 
did  not  attend  meetings  and  many  lost  their  right  to  vote.  At 
the  last  IWC  meetings,  the  number  of  parties  with  the  right to
vote  was  down  to 27 (Andresen, 1990). Obviously,  this  lends 
support to the assumption  that  hese  countries  had  been 
“recruited” to secure  the  adoption  of  the  moratorium. 
Considerable  energy  and  time  have  been  spent  on this and  related 
questions,  diverting  attention  from  the  other  more  important 
tasks  of  the  IWC. 
Within  the  strong  anti-whaling  sentiment  surrounding  the  IWC 
for  the  last  decade,  there  is  a  relatively  small  group or coalition 
of some  five or six  scientists  within  the  Scicom  who  have  had 
an  important  impact  upon  the  turn  of  events  within  the “new” 
IWC  through  their  scientific  competence  and  knowledge  and 
understanding  of  the  game  (Wettestad  and  Andresen, 1991). The 
informal  “group  leader”  has  been Dr. Sidney  Holt,  now 
representing  the  Seychelles,  but  originally  from  the U.K. He 
has  been  one  of  the  leading  scientific  experts  in  this  field  for 
decades,  but  for  quite  some  time now  he  has  had  very  close 
associations  with  the  environmental moiement and  perhaps the 
preservationist  movement  (Schweder, 1993). Other  members 
of  the  group  of  scientists  (from  the U S ,  the  Netherlands and 
Australia)  share  his  views  on  whaling  and  have  equally  close 
ties to the environmental movement (Schweder, 1993). The 
large  majority  of the non-whaling  IWC  members, on the  other 
hand,  have  tended  to  be  very  passive  and  mainly  confine  their 
activity  to  the  last  phase  of  the  negotiations by supporting  the 
views  of  the  “activist”  non-whaling  nations  such as the U.S., 
U.K., Australia and New Zealand (Andresen, 1990). The 
traditional  whaling  nations  have  been  active  and  vocal  in  their 
opposition to this  group,  but  they  have had  difficulty  in  handling 
their  very  capable  opponents.  However,  the  dominance of this 
group  cannot be seen  isolated  from the formidable  power  groups 
they  represent.  Also,  the  strong  scientific  effort  of  the  previous 
whaling  nations,  as  well as the  higher  political  priority  given 
to the issue  in  these  countries, may  come  to  alter  this  balance 
of power  somewhat,  provided  they do not  follow  the  example 
made by Iceland. 
Although Dr. Holt  and  his  associates  in  a  sense  have  been 
excellent  entrepreneurs,  given  their  views on the  mission of the 
IWC, it is more doubtN whether they deserve this label, 
considering  the  original  and  official  purpose  of  the  IWC, which 
is not preservation of whales, but conservation and orderly 
development of the whaling industry. Also, their mixing of 
scientific and political roles and motives - the key factor 
underlying  their  success - can  hardly  be  said  to  be  consistent 
with the procedural setup of the IWC. Nevertheless, the 
functioning  of  this  group  is  very  interesting  in  a  more  general 
analysis  of  international  negotiations. 
CONCLUDING  COMMENTS 
The  effectiveness  of  the IWC has  varied  considerably  over 
time.  While  effectiveness  was low in  the  first  phase  due to the 
“malign”  nature of the problem  and  low  institutional  capacity, 
the  effectiveness  was  on  the  increase  from  the  mid-1960s  to  the 
end  of  the  1970s.  The  issues  at  stake  for  the  whaling  nations 
were  more  moderate,  making  the  problem “easier,” and  the 
problem-solving  capacity  of  the IWC was  on  the  increase.  In 
the most recent phase this has changed once more and the 
whaling  issue  has  again  become  more  difficult as a  result of 
increased  political  complexity,  with  strong  emotional  and  moral 
elements  involved. Thus, polarization  isagain strong, 
preferences  incompatible and, according to this  analysis, 
effectiveness is again reduced. Needless to say, others may 
arrive at  the  opposite  conclusion  concerning  this  last  phase, 
considering  the  very  disparate  opinions  on  the  issue  of  whaling. 
The  main  structure  of the changing  problem at hand  explains 
some  of  the  most  important  variations  in  effectiveness. 
However,  the  importance  of  the  problem-solving  capacity  and 
especially  institutional  aspects  can by no  means be disregarded, 
illustrated by the  significance  of  the  inclusive  nature  of the IWC 
for the adoption of the moratorium. On the other hand, the 
analysis  of  this  case  illustrates  that  one  should  avoid  placing 
too much emphasis on the formal structures and goals of 
organizations.  Clearly,  the IWC is  a  totally  different  body  today 
from  what  it  was  in  its  early  years,  although  goal(s)  and  formal 
structure remain the same. In order to understand the more 
detailed  working  of  the  relationship  between  our  two  explanatory 
perspectives, the analysis  has  to be broadened  to  include  more 
cases as well as more  in-depth  analysis  of  the  different  cases 
than  has  been  provided  here  (Underdal et al., 1992). As  noted 
in the introduction,  the  aim  of  this  article  has  been to provide 
an  outline  of  the  analytical  perspective as a way  of  systematizing 
the  history  and  performance of the  whaling  regime. 
Finally, as to  the  future of the IWC, its  next  meeting  in  Tokyo 
in  1993 may prove  to  be  quite  decisive  in  the  sense  that  the 
revised  management  procedure  is  now  in  place  and  certain  whale 
species  may  be  hunted  according to the  formula  adopted. We 
will  then  learn  which  countries  stick to the  original  goal(s)  of 
the  ICRW  and  which are opposed to  whaling  on  moral  grounds. 
If  this  latter  view  prevails,  surely  a  new  convention  should  be 
negotiated  reflecting  the  real  goal  of  these  countries.  If  that 
should  prove to be  the  case,  however, it may  be  expected  that 
countries with material interests involved in whaling will 
seriously  consider  setting  up  an  alternative  organization to the 
IWC. A North Atlantic Marine Mammals Committee has 
already  been  established by previous  whaling  nations. So far, 
this  can  be  considered  a  supplement to the IWC. If, however, 
the IWC does  not  allow  any  commercial  whaling at the next 
meeting, it may  be  a  real  alternative to the IWC (Hoel,  1993). 
Two possible competing bodies with different goals would 
clearly  increase  tension  over the management  of  whales.  On 
the other hand, if commercial catching of whales is again 
allowed  within  the  framework  of  the RMP, countries  like  Iceland 
may consider  rejoining  the IWC and  the  organization may once 
more  be  on  the  track  of  cautious  management  of  whales  within 
the  limits  of  scientific  advice. 
~~ ~ 
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